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Picture yourself as a general business attorney who has been practicing for decades.  A 
client comes into your office seeking some advice.  He has a privately held corporation and 
wants to give employees and non-employee members of the board of directors an additional 
incentive to keep the value of the company stock high by aligning their interests more closely 
with those of shareholders generally.  In addition, he would like to use these stock options to 
reward these individuals, so he would like to give them the opportunity to buy the stock for less 
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than the fair market value of the shares.  So you go ahead and draft up some employee stock 
options.  Other than the discount, they are plain vanilla stock options, with no vesting schedule, 
exercisable at the discretion of the holder for a period of years. 
Congratulations, you’ve just subjected your client’s employees to immediate inclusion of 
the amount of the spread in gross income, regardless of when they actually exercise the option, 
giving rise to taxation of up to thirty-five percent.  Add to that a twenty percent excise tax, just 
for good measure.  Of course, it will probably be a while before anyone realizes that you screwed 
up, so interest will be accruing from the date of grant. 
What if he didn’t even want to issue the options at a discount, but instead at fair market 
value.  He even brings you an independent valuation he had performed a couple years ago.  
Surely now you would be safe drafting up some plain vanilla options, right?  Unfortunately, no 
luck here either. 
Where did you go wrong?  You’ve been doing this for years and this has never happened.  
You based the options on the same sections of the Internal Revenue Code that you always have, 
specifically Sections 421 through 424.  You even double-checked to make sure they hadn’t been 
amended.  In fact, these weren’t even drafted as incentive stock options, so they weren’t subject 
to all of the extra requirements in Section 422.  So why are you now faced with an unpleasant 
call to your malpractice carrier?  Because you forgot to check in the regulations relating to 
nonqualified deferred compensation. 
If your never would have thought to look there and you feel that scattering rules relating 
to stock options throughout the 397 pages of recently finalized nonqualified deferred 
compensation regulations represents a low blow by the IRS, you’re not alone.  With the 
enactment of Code Section 409A, practitioners in other areas are increasingly finding that they 
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have wandered unwittingly into the realm of deferred compensation, a practice area in which it is 
hard to stay current, even for attorneys practicing exclusively in that area. 
It appears that Congress basically eradicated discounted stock options as we knew them, 
but the majority of practitioners failed to notice because Congress accomplished this task under 
the guise of pension legislation.  Under Section 409A, nonqualified deferred compensation can 
only be payable upon the occurrence of certain enumerated events.  While most stock options are 
exempt from the application of this section, discounted stock options are not.  As a result, if a 
company wishes to issue a discounted stock option, it essentially must specify at the outset when 
the option will be exercised.  In doing so, the fundamental nature of the option is destroyed by 
eliminating the holder's discretion over when to exercise the option.  Worse yet, many privately-
held companies are issuing options at a discount without even realizing it, because their 
valuation methods are not up to par.  This paper explores the recent development of the law in 
this area and offers suggestions for improvement.  In addition, practical advice is provided for 
working with stock options unless and until the proposed improvements are implemented. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Fundamentals of Employee Stock Options 
 As a derivative, a stock option is a “financial contract . . . which is derived from the 
future value of an underlying asset.”1  Although derivatives can be quite complex and the 
strategies employed by those trading in derivatives markets can be mind-boggling, a typical 
stock option used for equity-based compensation is fairly straight forward.  “An option contract 
confers the right, but not the obligation, to buy . . . a specific underlying instrument at a specific 
price – the strike or exercise price – up until or on a specific future date – the [expiration] date.”2 
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 1.  Nonqualified Stock Options versus Incentive Stock Options 
 Employee stock options generally take one of two forms:  nonqualified stock options 
(“NSOs”)3 or incentive stock options (“ISOs”).4  In order to qualify as an incentive stock option, 
the option must meet certain requirements outlined in Code Section 422.  Nonqualified options 
are essentially just stock options that do not meet the Code Section 422 requirements for special 
treatment, and are therefore subject to taxation under Code Section 83.5  In addition, if an option 
states by its terms that it will not be treated as an incentive stock option, that option will be 
treated as a nonqualified option even if it would otherwise satisfy the requirements of an 
incentive stock option.6  
 First, incentive stock options can only be issued to employees, who must exercise the 
option while they are still employed by the corporation or within a certain limited time after 
termination.7  Thus, non-employee members of the corporation’s board of directors are not 
eligible to receive incentive stock options.8  In order to qualify as an incentive stock option, a 
stock option has to be issued pursuant to a plan that has been approved by shareholders of the 
corporation within the last ten years.9  The plan must specify the number of shares authorized to 
be issued.10  Incentive stock options cannot be issued at a discount,11 and are only valid for ten 
years after the date of grant.12  In addition, the option must be exercisable, during the option 
holder’s lifetime, only by the option holder, and may be transferred only through will or 
probate.13  Finally, an individual who owns more than ten percent of the total combined voting 
power of all outstanding classes of stock is not eligible to receive an incentive stock option.14 
 The primary difference between the two types of options from the perspective of the 
option holder is the tax consequences.  Ignoring, for now, the impact of Code Section 409A, the 
spread on a nonqualified stock option is taxable upon exercise.15  The aggregate difference 
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between the fair market value of the underlying shares and the exercise price of the options is 
treated as compensation and is thus includible as ordinary income.16  At present the highest tax 
bracket for ordinary income applicable to individuals is 35%.17 
 The spread on incentive stock options, on the other hand, is not taxable upon exercise, but 
rather is taxable on ultimate disposition of the underlying stock, provided the option holder 
complies with certain requirements.18  The most important of these requirements is that the 
option holder waits a minimum of one year after the date of exercise to sell the stock.  In 
addition, incentive stock options create the potential for capital gains treatment.  If the employee 
waits to sell the underlying stock until the later of (1) two years after the date of grant or (2) one 
year after the date of exercise, any gain on the sale of the stock is treated as a long-term capital 
gain.19  The long-term capital gains rate for taxpayers in the highest individual tax bracket is 
currently 15%.20 
2.  American Style Stock Options versus European Style Stock Options 
 There are two basic styles of stock options:  American and European.21  An American 
style option is exercisable, at the discretion of the option holder, at any time prior to its 
expiration date.22  In contrast, a European style option is exercisable only upon its predetermined 
expiration date.23  Because of this distinction, where an American option and a European option 
are otherwise identical, the American option will be more valuable on account of its 
comparatively greater flexibility.24  At least prior to the enactment of Code Section 409A, 
virtually every employee stock option (both nonqualified stock options and incentive stock 
options) was granted as an American style option.25 
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B.  The Enactment of Code Section 409A 
 Prior to the enactment of Code Section 409A, nonqualified deferred compensation 
arrangements were largely governed by the common law principles of the economic benefit 
doctrine and the doctrine of constructive receipt.26 
 Under the economic benefit doctrine, amounts become taxable to the employee when 
they are irreversibly set aside for the employee’s benefit.27  Therefore, once the amounts are not 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, they become taxable to the employee.  This doctrine has 
been codified in Code Section 83 for some time.  However, Code Section 83, by its terms, 
applies to the transfer of “property.”28  Because Treasury Regulation Section 1.83-3 defines 
property as “real and personal property other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured 
promise to pay money or property in the future,”29 most traditional nonqualified deferred 
compensation plans avoided taxation under Code Section 83 by taking advantage of the 
“unfunded and unsecured” language.30  Many of these arrangements are structured as “rabbi 
trusts,”31 under which the funds are held in a trust and cannot be taken back by the employer, but 
are still subject to claims by company’s general unsecured creditors in bankruptcy or 
insolvency.32  “A rabbi trust helps assure employees that their employer will have the liquidity to 
pay promised benefits . . . although it will not protect them against the employer’s insolvency.”33 
Stock options are dealt with specifically in Treasury Regulation Section 1.83-7.  That 
regulation provides that Code Section 83(a) will apply to stock options, other than incentive 
stock options, “if the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value . . . at the time the 
option is granted.”34  These options continue to be subject to Code Section 83 after the passage 
of Code Section 409A.  However, for certain of these options, Code Section 409A will override 
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the application of Code Section 83, leading to harsh tax consequences and more limited planning 
opportunities. 
More directly affected by the enactment of Code Section 409A is the doctrine of 
constructive receipt.  Almost all individual taxpayers are on the cash method of accounting for 
tax purposes, meaning that they recognize income when that income is actually received.35  The 
doctrine of constructive receipt provides an exception to this general premise.36  “In essence, the 
doctrine of constructive receipt means a taxpayer cannot turn his back on income or, more 
accurately, the cash method taxpayer who has control over his actual receipt of income must 
report it, regardless of whether he has actual physical possession of it.”37  This principle is 
described in more detail in Treasury Regulation Section 1.451-2(a): 
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer’s possession is constructively 
received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set 
apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any 
time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of 
intention to withdraw had been given.  However, income is not constructively 
received if the taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations 
or restrictions.38 
 
Prior to the adoption of Code Section 409A, the area of constructive receipt was fleshed 
out by case holdings and rulings by the IRS, which had evolved into rules that received the 
general acquiescence of benefits practitioners.39  Several of the provisions of Code Section 
409A, including some specifically applicable to stock options, incorporate these principles of 
constructive receipt developed at common law and administratively.  However, some of these 
principles were altered or even reversed in the process of codification.  For instance, “it was 
commonly accepted that a provision allowing an employee to make a subsequent election to 
further extend the deferral of benefits would not be taxable under the doctrine of constructive 
receipt, as long as the subsequent selection was made before the benefits were due to be paid.”40  
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In the context of stock options, this principle would have allowed the employee holding the 
option to extend the exercise date of the option.  However, “while § 409A [was] not technically 
designed to overrule common law doctrines, the practical effect of the statute’s requirements will 
be to overrule or limit a number of practices allowed under prior cases and rulings, [including the 
aforementioned extension provision].”41 
Section 409A was added to the Internal Revenue Code by Section 885 of the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004.42  Some have claimed that it represented a congressional overreaction 
to perceived abuses of nonqualified deferred compensation plans during the Enron scandal.43  
Ironically, the tragic losses of the retirement savings of rank-and-file workers at Enron were the 
result of a blackout period provision prohibiting trades in the company’s qualified 401(k) plan, 
which was over-invested in employer stock.44  This disaster may have been accentuated when 
executives took advantage of early withdrawal provisions in the company’s nonqualified 
arrangements, but the losses for rank-and-file workers were not caused by these transactions or 
any other abuse of the company’s nonqualified arrangements.45  Ironically though, the events at 
Enron served as a catalyst for lawmakers to revamp the laws governing nonqualified deferred 
compensation arrangements. 
C.  Penalties for Violation of Code Section 409A 
 The consequences for violation of Code Section 409A have been described as a 
“draconian penalty regime.”46  In general, if an arrangement subject to Code Section 409A fails 
to meet its requirements, all compensation deferred under the arrangement to that point that is 
not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is immediately includible in gross income.47  In 
addition, the amount that is includible in gross income is subject to an additional twenty percent 
excise tax.48  Finally, interest is due on the amount included in gross income at the underpayment 
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rate plus one percent, calculated from the point at which the amounts should have first been 
included in gross income (i.e., the year of the deferral or, if later, the year in which the amounts 
were no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture).49 
Although the IRS has provided only limited guidance as to exactly how these amounts 
should be calculated with respect to stock options,50 practitioners can make an educated guess 
through reasoning by analogy to traditional nonqualified deferred compensation plans.  What is 
relatively certain in this regard is that the amount deferred under a stock option is equal to the 
amount of the spread, or the excess of the fair market value of the underlying stock over the 
exercise price on the date of exercise.51  Therefore, the spread is includible in gross income and 
subject to the additional twenty percent excise tax. 
The methodology for calculating the interest component of the penalties is not as straight 
forward.52  Discounted stock options have a built in spread on the date of grant.  Therefore, 
perhaps interest should be calculated on this spread from the date of grant until the exercise date.  
On the other hand, these options generally continue to have a spread, and that spread varies over 
time until the date of exercise.  The spread on the date of exercise provides a more accurate 
representation of the benefit provided to the employee.  However, logically, if the spread upon 
exercise is used, interest should not begin accruing until the date of exercise (which of course 
would not yield any interest).  It is possible that the IRS could require use of the spread upon 
exercise (which would generally be larger than the spread at the date of grant), but calculate 
interest upon that spread from the date of grant.  A final possibility could involve keeping track 
of the spread as it increases and decreases from the date of grant until the date of exercise, and 
calculating interest from each of these valuation dates.  Some of these possibilities seem to be 
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unreasonably punitive and an administrative nightmare, but, then again, so does the rest of Code 
Section 409A. 
 Significantly, all plans of the same type are aggregated for Code Section 409A purposes.  
All deferrals of compensation with respect to an employee under arrangements that constitute 
“stock rights” are treated as a single plan.53  Therefore, if an employee has income from any one 
stock option included by reason of Code Section 409A, all amounts deferred under all 
nonqualified stock options and stock appreciation rights held by that employee become 
immediately includible in income and subject to the penalties and interest associated with that 
inclusion.54 
II.  CODE SECTION 409A AS APPLIED TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 There are essentially two ways to avoid the harsh penalties of Code Section 409A.  The 
first is to be exempt from application of its requirements.  Arrangements that are not exempt 
must satisfy all of Code Section 409A’s requirements, both in form and operation.  While most 
stock options are exempt from Code Section 409A, discounted options are not.  Furthermore, 
while it is theoretically possible to draft a discounted option in compliance with Code Section 
409A, as a practical matter, an option so drafted would lose much of its value. 
A.  In General, Discounted Nonqualified Stock Options are not Exempt from Code Section 409A 
Under Code Section 409A, any plan that “provides for the deferral of compensation” 
constitutes a nonqualified deferred compensation plan unless specifically exempted.55  “A plan 
provides for the deferral of compensation if . . . [the employee]56 has a legally binding right 
during a taxable year to compensation that . . . is or may be payable to [the employee] in a later 
taxable year.”57  However, incentive stock options and options granted pursuant to an employee 
stock purchase plan are deemed not to constitute a deferral of compensation.58 
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Nonqualified stock options are deemed not to provide for a deferral of compensation, and 
therefore are exempt from the application of Code Section 409A, only if certain requirements are 
met.  First, the exercise price must be at least equal to the fair market value of the underlying 
stock on the date of grant.59  Second, the number of shares available under the option must be 
fixed on the date of grant.60  Third, transfer or exercise of the option must be taxable under Code 
Section 83 and Treasury Regulation Section 1.83-7.61  Finally, the option must not contain any 
other feature providing for the deferral of compensation.62  Obviously, discounted nonqualified 
stock options will fail the first requirement because, by definition, their exercise price will be 
less than the fair market value of the underlying shares.  These discounted options will therefore 
not be exempt from Code Section 409A. 
1.  Valuation problems for non-publicly traded companies 
 These new rules are especially troublesome at privately-held companies.  While publicly-
traded companies face a new set of rules if they choose to issue discounted options, they benefit 
from being able to identify, with relative certainty, when they have breached this arena.   
Privately-held companies, on the other hand, may be issuing stock options subject to Code 
Section 409A without realizing it. 
 This is because one of the main triggers for the application of Code Section 409A is the 
discount on a stock option.63  Determining whether the stock option has been issued at a discount 
requires measuring the fair market value of the underlying stock.64  This is a relatively straight 
forward process for a publicly traded company.  However, the “rule is unduly burdensome and 
restrictive for private companies. . . .”65 
The regulations issued pursuant to Code Section 409A provide that for a company whose 
stock that is readily tradable on an established securities market, fair market value may be 
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determined by “any . . . reasonable method using actual transactions in such stock as reported by 
such market.”66  Permitted valuations include, but are not limited to:  “the last sale before or the 
first sale after the grant, the closing price on the trading day before or the trading day of the 
grant, [and] the arithmetic mean of the high and low prices on the trading day before or the 
trading day of the grant.”67  Thus, publicly-traded companies are given the freedom to use any 
reasonable method using readily available actual market data, and are provided with several 
simple examples of what will suffice. 
 Contrast this with privately-held companies, who are given a facts-and-circumstances 
standard.  “[I]n the case of [company] stock that is not readily tradable on an established 
securities market, the fair market value of the stock . . . means a value determined by the 
reasonable application of a reasonable valuation method.”68  Notice that, at first blush, this 
sounds approximately the same as the “any . . . reasonable method”69 standard for publicly-
traded companies.  However, instead being followed by a list of simple calculations deemed to 
be reasonable, the standard for privately-held companies is followed by a laundry list of factors 
that will be considered in a facts-and-circumstances test,70 which include: 
The value of tangible and intangible assets of the corporation, the present value of 
anticipated future cash-flows of the corporation, the market value of stock or 
equity interest in similar corporations and other entities engaged in trades or 
businesses substantially similar to those engaged in by the corporation the stock 
of which is to be valued, the value of which can be readily determined through 
nondiscretionary, objective means (such as through trading prices on an 
established securities market or an amount paid in an arm’s lenth private 
transaction), recent arm’s length transactions involving the sale or transfer of such 
stock or equity interests, and other relevant factors such as control premiums or 
discounts for lack of marketability and which the valuation method is used for 
other purposes that have a material economic effect on the service recipient, its 
stockholders, or its creditors.71 
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The facts-and-circumstances standard, together with this plethora of factors considered, make it 
virtually impossible for a privately-held company to determine, with any degree of certainty, the 
fair market value of its stock and whether the exercise price on its stock options is discounted.  
Therefore, it is difficult for a privately-held company to navigate this “maze of parameters and 
restrictions”72 and emerge confident that its stock options are not subject to the rigid 
requirements of Code Section 409A. 
 To make matters worse, a valuation process will not be considered reasonable unless it 
takes into account “all available information material to the value of the corporation.”73  
Furthermore, an earlier valuation (even if reasonable when calculated) will no longer be 
considered reasonable if this material information changes.74  Even something as seemingly 
benign as the resolution of a material lawsuit would be considered a change in material 
information that would invalidate the calculation.75  Finally, regardless of whether any change in 
material information has occurred, no valuation more than twelve months old will be considered 
reasonable.76  Not only do these requirements make the facts-and-circumstances test harder to 
satisfy, they require frequent (at least annual) valuations which could prove prohibitively 
expensive for smaller privately-held companies. 
 Perhaps because it realized how onerous of a task meeting this facts-and-circumstances 
test would be, the Department of Treasury provided three valuation methods which will be 
granted a presumption of reasonableness.77  The first is an independent appraisal performed 
within the last twelve months.78  While this presumptively reasonable valuation technique 
provides certainty to privately-held companies, it is likely to be significantly more expensive 
than performing the valuation in house and will still have to be performed at least annually.  The 
price of an initial valuation by an independent appraiser has been estimated at $10,000 to 
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$15,000.79  Presumably, the price would decrease in future years, but would still represent a 
significant cash outlay, which “will make this option cost-prohibitive for smaller to medium-
sized companies.”80  
 The second presumptively reasonable valuation method is a formula based on the tax 
principles governing the valuation of shares subject to nonlapse restrictions, which must be 
consistently applied for all purposes, both compensatory and noncompensatory.81  A “nonlapse 
restriction,” defined in Treasury Regulation Section 1.83-3(h), is a “permanent limitation on the 
transferability of property which will require the transferee of the property to sell, or offer to sell, 
such property at a price determined under a formula, and which will continue to apply to and be 
enforced against the transferee or any subsequent holder. . . .”82  For instance, a right of first 
refusal at a price determined under a formula, would be a nonlapse restriction.83  For shares 
subject to a nonlapse restriction, the price determined under the formula will ordinarily be 
considered to be the fair market value of the shares, particularly if the formula is based upon 
book value, a reasonable multiple of earnings, or a reasonable combination of the two.84  This 
valuation method appears to be of very limited usefulness, as it would be relatively rare for the 
stock underlying a stock option to have such nonlapse restrictions. 
 The third valuation method carrying a presumption of reasonableness is essentially just a 
written valuation made in good faith taking into account all of the factors for the facts and 
circumstances determination discussed above, performed by an individual qualified to perform 
such a calculation.85  While this third method is similar to the first, note that it allows for the 
valuation to be performed by an insider at the company, which would likely result in significant 
cost savings.  In order to be considered qualified, the individual would generally have five years 
of pertinent experience and would be the type of person on whose advice another reasonable 
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individual would rely with respect to such a valuation.86  While this quasi-safe harbor appears, at 
first blush, to be a gaping hole in the valuation rules, it is of little practical significance because it 
applies only to the “illiquid stock of a start-up corporation.”87  Thus, this third presumptively 
reasonable valuation method may not be used by ongoing enterprises.  In addition, even for 
illiquid stock of start-up corporations, this third method may not be used if a change in control is 
expected to occur within the next 90 days or an initial public offering (IPO) is expected in the 
next 180 days.88 
As indicated above, incentive stock options are also prohibited from being issued at a 
discount.89  Curiously though, the determination of fair market value for purposes of issuing 
incentive stock options is satisfied by a good faith effort.90  Incentive stock options need only 
satisfy this lax standard while nonqualified stock options are held to a much more rigorous 
scrutiny.  There does not appear to be any policy reason that would justify imposing two very 
different standards for the same exemption from Code Section 409A 
 2.  Limited Exemptions from the Code Section 409A 
 There are two exemptions which will allow a limited number of discounted nonqualified 
stock options to avoid the strictures of Code Section 409A.  Though these exemptions are very 
valuable for certain other arrangements,91 they are of limited usefulness in the context of stock 
options.  These exemptions are the short-term deferral rule and the grandfather rule. 
  a.  The Short-Term Deferral Rule 
 The short-term deferral rule provides an exemption for amounts paid within two and one-
half months of the close of the taxable year of the employee or employer (whichever ends later) 
in which it is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.92  If both the employee and 
employer are on the calendar year, this means that the amounts must be received by March 15 of 
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the year after the year in which they are deemed deferred.  In the context of discounted stock 
options, this means that the employee may be permitted to exercise his or her option by March 
15 of the year subsequent to the year of issuance, without triggering the application of Code 
Section 409A.  As a practical matter, a stock option with such a short time frame would do little 
to align the goals of the employee with the goals of the stockholders, and thus would fail in one 
of its essential functions. 
  b.  Arrangements Grandfathered from the Application of Code Section 409A 
 Amounts deferred and vested prior to January 1, 2005 are grandfathered from the 
application of Code Section 409A.93  This can be a very powerful exemption from Code Section 
409A, shielding any stock options issued and vested prior to January 1, 2005 from the 
application of that Code Section.  However, its utility is limited by two factors. 
 First, because only options earned and vested prior to January 1, 2005 are protected, the 
exemption is useless as a prospective planning tool.  Second, this grandfathered status will be 
lost on any options that are modified after October 3, 2004.94  Thus, for example, the window for 
the exercise of these options may not be extended without losing grandfathered status.  In fact, 
while this practice was quite commonplace prior to the enactment of Code Section 409A, it is all 
but prohibited under the new regime.  In a post-409A world, extension of the exercise date of an 
in-the-money95 option will result in the option being treated as “having had an additional deferral 
feature from the original date of grant, and therefore will be treated as a plan providing for the 
deferral of compensation from the original grant date.”96  Recall that this will cause the option to 
be subject to Code Section 409A, even if the option was not issued at a discount.97  In addition, 
unless the extension is made one year before the option could have been exercised and (in most 
cases) prohibits the exercise of the option for at least five years, the extension also causes the 
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stock option to fail Code Section 409A’s requirements and brings its taxes and penalties into 
play.98  Thus, the grandfather rule exempting certain arrangements from Code Section 409A has 
limited applicability, particularly from the perspective of a practitioner seeking to engage in 
strategic prospective planning. 
B.  Drafting Nonqualified Stock Options to be Compliant with Code Section 409A 
Failure to find an exemption, however, does not necessarily mean that the employee will 
have a tax problem.  It is, at least in theory, possible to draft these discounted stock options so 
that they are in compliance with Code Section 409A.  As a practical matter, however, doing so 
significantly decreases their value. 
Code Section 409A has three overarching requirements that must be met in order to avoid 
its penalties.  First, distributions99 may not be made other than on account of certain enumerated 
events.100  Second, the time or schedule of distributions may not be accelerated.101  Third, certain 
requirements must be met with regard to initial and subsequent elections to defer 
compensation.102  While the second and third requirements have a somewhat limited application  
in the stock option arena,103 the first requirement is the equivalent of an anvil dropped on the 
traditional structure of a stock option.  This requirement fundamentally alters the operation of 
options to which it applies. 
Code Section 409A(a)(2) requires that distributions from nonqualified deferred 
compensation plans occur only on account of:  (1) separation from service, (2) disability, (3) 
death, (4) a specified time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule), (5) a change of ownership or 
effective control of the company, or (6) an unforeseeable emergency.104  Because the event upon 
which or the date on which the option will be exercised must be fixed at the outset, much of the 
value of the option is destroyed.  In essence, Code Section 409A forces discounted employee 
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stock options to be structured as something closer to European style options.  Certain provisions 
(discussed in Section IV below) relax the strict timing requirements of Code Section 409A to 
some extent and allow for certain planning opportunities, but the effect is still to create a slightly 
relaxed version of the European style option that is less valuable to the employee than an 
American style option.105  “[T]he benefit of a stock option versus other forms of equity 
compensation has always been the ability of the employee to decide when to exercise, and thus 
dictate his/her tax event.”106 
III.  MODIFICATION OF THE 409A REGULATIONS TO PERMIT THE CUSTOMARY EXERCISE OF 
OPTIONS 
 Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-3(b) should be amended by adding the following 
new sentence after the second sentence of that Section:  “Notwithstanding the foregoing, a stock 
option will be deemed to provide payment upon a permissible payment event if the stock option 
satisfies paragraph (i)(1)(vi) of this section.”   
In addition, subsection (vi) of Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-3(i)(1) should be 
redenominated at subsection (vii), and the following new subsection should be added as 
subsection (vi): 
“(vi) Stock Rights.  A stock option that fails to meet the requirements of § 1.409A-
1(b)(5)(i)(A) because it fails to satisfy paragraph (1) of that section meets the requirements of a 
specified date or fixed schedule of payments with respect to amounts received as a result of 
exercise of that option if the following conditions are met: 
(1) The stock option is exercisable until an expiration date that is fixed as of the date 
such option was granted. 
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(2) The stock option does not fail to meet either paragraph (2) or (3) of § 1.409A-
1(b)(5)(i)(A). 
(3) The stock option does not represent deferred compensation otherwise subject to 
section 409A, which has been structured as a stock option to avoid the application of that 
section.” 
There are a variety of policy reasons that favor such a change.  To begin with, the IRS 
already had effective tools to regulate discounted stock options prior to the enactment of Code 
Section 409A.  The Service could police abusive arrangements using the economic benefit 
principles codified in Code Section 83 and the common law doctrine of constructive receipt 
developed through the administrative rulings of the Service and the decisions of courts.107  If the 
Service wished to reverse its position on certain issues (for instance, the pre-409A position of 
allowing subsequent elections to further extend the deferral of benefits108), such a reversal could 
have been accomplished by far less drastic means than a total overhaul of nonqualified deferred 
compensation law, which suddenly now encompasses stock options.   
Some may concede that discounted stock options should be taxed to a greater extent than 
stock options issued at fair market value.  However, the penalties for violation of Code Section 
409A are so extreme as to make discounted stock options basically worthless when structured as 
an American option.  It may be admitted that discounted stock options were not a particularly 
favored instrument for compensating executives even before the passage of Code Section 409A, 
due to, among other factors, the effect on shareholder perception and changes in accounting 
rules.  However, while these considerations would discourage companies from issuing 
discounted stock options, those discounted stock options could still be issued if the company felt 
they were needed notwithstanding the negative implications.  Furthermore, these types of 
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considerations represent the proper avenues through which to address the issuance of such 
options, rather than using extreme taxation as a tool to effectively preclude two parties from 
entering into a transaction, depriving them of their freedom to contract. 
Moreover, the valuation rules put smaller, privately-held employers at a distinct 
disadvantage to larger, publicly-traded companies.  Unless these smaller, privately-held 
employers are willing to make significant cash outlays for annual independent valuations or to 
roll the dice with a facts-and-circumstances standard, they cannot be sure whether they will be 
deemed to have issued their options at a discount.109  This lack of certainty is likely to have an 
adverse impact on the smaller, privately-held companies’ ability to attract talent, because, as 
mentioned above, the adverse tax consequences resulting from a violation of Code Section 409A 
fall squarely on the shoulders of the employee.110   
IV.  DRAFTING OPTIONS FOR 409A COMPLIANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF REGULATORY 
MODIFICATION 
 Unless and until the modifications suggested by the preceding section are implemented, 
discounted qualified options are largely dead as we know them today.  However, there are still a 
few ways to draft employee stock options in compliance with Code Section 409A without totally 
destroying their practicality. 
A.  Options Exercisable Upon a Change of Control 
As a practical matter, many stock options are exercised upon a change in control; such 
was the case even prior to the enactment of Code Section 409A.111  As previously discussed, a 
employee stock option can be drafted to comply with Code Section 409A by limiting exercise of 
the option to certain predetermined permissible events.112  The problem is that not all of these 
permissible distributable events are well-suited in the context of employee stock options.  
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However, one permissible event that is particularly well suited is a change of ownership or 
effective control of the company. 
Under the 409A final regulations a change in control includes “the occurrence of a 
change in the ownership of the corporation . . . , a change in effective control of the corporation . 
. . , or a change in the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of the corporation . . . .”113  
An arrangement is permitted to designate all, or any combination of, these change in control 
events as a distributable event.  However, the regulations require that these events be objectively 
determinable.114 
Under the final 409A regulations, a change in ownership occurs on the date of a 
transaction wherein one person or group acquires stock in the corporation that causes that person 
or group to possess more than half of the total fair market value or total voting power of the 
corporation.115  However, if the parties so desire, an arrangement is permitted to substitute any 
ownership threshold over fifty percent for these purposes.116 
A change in effective control occurs in the same circumstances as a change in ownership, 
except that the ownership threshold required is only thirty percent.117  Again, the parties are free 
to specify any ownership threshold over that thirty percent for these purposes.118  In addition, a 
change in effective control is deemed to occur on “[t]he date a majority of members of the 
corporation’s board of directors is replaced during any 12-month period by directors whose 
appointment or election is not endorsed by a majority of the members of the corporation’s board 
of directors before the date of the appointment or election. . . .”119  As might be expected, the 
parties are permitted to require more than a simply majority for these purposes.120 
A change in ownership of a substantial portion of the corporation’s assets is defined as 
the date when any person or group acquires at least forty percent of the value of the assets of the 
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corporation (without regard to liabilities).121  Of course, if they so desire, the parties may specify 
any threshold exceeding forty percent.122  In the case of a change in ownership, there are also 
certain rules regarding transfers between related parties to determine whether a change in 
ownership has actually occurred.123 
Substantial additional flexibility is provided by Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-
3(d), which provides that “a payment is treated as made upon the date specified under the plan  
. . . if the payment is made at such date or a later date within the same taxable year of the 
[employee]. . . .”124  Thus, an employee stock option could give the holder until the end of the 
year in which the change in control occurs to exercise.  An argument could be made that an 
option could be drafted to give the option holder until the later of the end of the taxable year or 
the fifteenth day of the third month after the change in control.  However, Treasury Regulation 
Section 1.409A-3(d) also requires that such a “later of” provision not give the employee the 
direct or indirect option to designate the taxable year of payment.  This is another situation where 
provisions that make sense as applied to traditional nonqualified deferred compensation plans do 
not translate well into the world of stock options.  Because a stock option vests the holder with 
discretion over when to exercise, inclusion of such “later of” language would inherently give the 
employee the impermissible option to designate the taxable year of payment. 
Finally, because a qualifying change in control is a permissible distributable event, 125 a 
stock option subject to this restriction on exercise can be immediately vested without triggering 
Code Section 409A’s adverse tax consequences. 
B.  Options Subject to Vesting Provisions  
Although the use of the above approach allows for immediate vesting, strategic use of 
vesting provisions provides another approach to structuring options to comply with the 
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requirements of Code Section 409A.  Recall that amounts deferred in an arrangement subject to 
Code Section 409A are not taxable until they are not longer subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture.126  “Compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if entitlement to the 
amount is conditioned on the performance of substantial future services. . . .”127  In other words, 
a vesting schedule will satisfy the substantial risk of forfeiture requirement. 
By containing a fixed exercise date or schedule of exercise dates that corresponds with 
the date or dates the options become vested, the options would satisfy Code Section 409A’s 
distribution-related requirements through being exercisable at a specified time (or pursuant to a 
fixed schedule).128  Here too, the drafter of the option should take advantage of the additional 
flexibility provided by Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-3(d), to give the holder until the end 
of the year in which the option vests in which to exercise it. 
A similar alternative approach could be used involving the short term deferral rule.129  If 
the option requires exercise by the 15th day of the third month after it vests, the option never 
actually provides for a deferral of compensation pursuant to the short term deferral rule discussed 
above.130  Therefore, such an option would be exempt from Code Section 409A.  However, this 
approach is not likely to be used often since the previous tactic will almost always provide the 
option holder with more flexibility in terms of when to exercise.  Just as with the aforementioned 
change in control strategy, it would not be permissible to give the employee until the later of the 
last day of the taxable year in which the option vests or the fifteenth day of the third month after 
the option vests, because it gives the employee the impermissible option to designate the taxable 
year of payment.131 
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CONCLUSION 
With regard to stock options, Code Section 409A represents a dangerous trap for the 
unsuspecting practitioner.  This far-reaching and punitive Code Section was passed in an all-too-
frequent Congressional overreaction to perceived abuses, the primary impetus in this case being 
the Enron scandal.  Though Code Section 409A applies by its terms to “nonqualified deferred 
compensation,” through it Congress quietly but effectively eradicated discounted stock options 
as we know them today.  No longer can discounted stock options be exercised up until a certain 
date, as would have been the case for an American style option. 
At first glance, this may not appear to be particularly significant because discounted stock 
options were used infrequently, as compared to other types of options.  However, it is important 
to note that incentive stock options may become subject to Code Section 409A as well if they are 
subsequently modified in a manner deemed impermissible under Code Section 409A.  In 
addition, small, privately-held companies may inadvertently issue nonqualified stock options at a 
discount because of the difficulty of ascertaining the fair market value of their shares.  Under the 
final Code Section 409A regulations, these small, privately-held companies will either need to 
take their chances that their valuation will hold up in a facts and circumstances determination, or 
invest a significant sum of money to achieve some certainty.  These considerations may deter 
small, privately-held companies from issuing stock options at all, which is unfortunate, since 
these are precisely the types of companies that cannot afford massive paychecks for executives 
and need these types of compensation structures to attract talent.  Even if a small, privately-held 
company is willing to venture into this treacherous territory, potential talent may not be so brave, 
since they, rather than their employers, will shoulder the punishment of this Draconian tax 
regime. 
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For these reasons, and others discussed above, the Internal Revenue Service should 
amend the Final Regulations issued pursuant to Code Section 409A to provide that discounted 
stock options will be deemed to be payable upon a “specified date or fixed schedule of 
payments” with respect to amounts received as a result of exercise of that option if the stock 
option is exercisable until an expiration date that is fixed as of the date such option was granted.  
This simple change would allow for the normal (i.e., American style) operation of stock options 
subject to Code Section 409A.  Additionally, this would alleviate, to a substantial degree, the 
disproportionate burden that Code Section 409A has placed on small, privately-held companies. 
However, unless and until these modifications are made, practitioners will be best served 
by treading carefully through the final regulations, which are incredibly voluminous and 
interwoven with cross-references.  The first step should be to see if the stock option in question 
might be exempt from the application of Code Section 409A.  This category will include 
incentive stock options (in the absence of impermissible modifications) and nonqualified stock 
options meeting certain requirements (the most prominent of which is that the option not be 
issued at a discount).  There are also two other exemptions of little practical usefulness:  stock 
options providing only for a short-term deferral and stock options grandfathered form the 
application of Code Section 409A.  If the stock option in question is not exempt from the 
application of Code Section 409A, the practitioner’s next step should be to determine whether 
the situation in question presents business circumstances that might suggest it would actually 
make sense to draft the stock option in compliance with the requirements of Code Section 409A.  
Such circumstances may be presented when the primary motivation is to protect an employee 
from a change in control, or where, for some reason, the employee is satisfied with the ability to 
exercise the option within a year of the option vesting.  If none of this fits, the practitioner’s only 
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remaining move is to draft the stock option as a European style option, exercisable on a date 
fixed at issuance. 
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